Understanding the minimal assumptions from which we can build a publickey encryption scheme secure against chosen-ciphertext attacks (a CCA-secure scheme, for short) is a central question in both practical and theoretical cryptography. Following the large body of work on hardness and correctness amplification, we ask the question of how far we can weaken a CCA-secure encryption scheme so that an efficient construction of a fully CCA-secure scheme from it can still be given. We consider a weak CCA-secure encryption scheme that has decryption error (1 − α)/2 and is only weakly CCA secure in the sense that an adversary can distinguish encryptions of different messages with possibly large advantage β < 1 − 1/poly. We show that whenever α 2 > β, the weak correctness and the weak CCA security properties can be simultaneously amplified to obtain a fully CCA-secure encryption scheme with negligible decryption error. Our approach relies both on a new hardcore lemma for the setting of CCA security, and on an extension of a recently proposed approach to obtain CCA security by Hohenberger, Lewko, and Waters (EUROCRYPT '12) to handle large decryption errors. Previously, such an amplification result was only known in the simpler case of security against chosen-plaintext attacks, as shown by Dwork, Naor, and Reingold (EUROCRYPT '04) and by Holenstein and Renner (CRYPTO '05).
Introduction

Public-key encryption and CCA security
The seminal work of Goldwasser and Micali [16] introduced the notion of semantic security as the basic security requirement for public-key encryption: It requires that no polynomial-time adversary can distinguish encryptions of any two messages m 0 and m 1 of its choice, except with negligible advantage, given only the public key. This is usually referred to as security against a chosen plaintext attack, or CPA security, for short. However, it turns out that many applications require a stronger notion of security known as (adaptive) chosen-ciphertext security (CCA security, for short) [44] , where the above indistinguishability requirement must hold true even for adversaries with the additional ability to query a decryption oracle; for this reason, CCA security is considered to be the golden standard for secure public-key encryption.
In contrast to the case of CPA security, where simple constructions from generic assumptions (such as trapdoor permutations (TDP)) can be given, delivering CCA-secure schemes from general assumptions proved itself to be a much more challenging problem. In particular, building a CCA-secure scheme from a CPA-secure one remains a major longstanding open problem. Constructions additionally relying on non-interactive zero-knowledge proof systems (NIZKs) are known [40, 12, 44, 46] . But, so far, all constructions of NIZKs require the existence (enhanced) TDPs, which are not known to be implied by CPA-secure encryption; furthermore, known constructions based on NIZKs are all non-black-box. It is in fact likely that no black-box construction of a CCA-secure scheme from a CPA-secure one exists, as confirmed at least for a certain natural class of constructions [14] . For this reason, efficient constructions have been instead given from more concrete families of assumptions, such as hash proof systems and variants thereof [9, 48] , lossy TDFs [43] , correlated-product secure TDFs [45] , adaptive TDFs [33] , or using random oracles [2, 3] .
Our results: From weak to strong CCA security
In this paper, we ask and answer the following question:
"How far can we weaken CCA security and still provide a black-box construction of a CCAsecure encryption scheme from a scheme only satisfying the weaker notion?"
Our approach builds upon the large body of works on security amplification, which considered a wide range of cryptographic primitives such as one-way functions and permutations [50, 15, 10, 18] , pseudorandom functions and permutations [38, 36, 11, 37, 47] , collision-resistant hash functions [5] , cryptographic puzzles and CAPTCHAs [4, 29, 31] , watermarking schemes [27] , two-party protocols like commitment and oblivious transfer [49, 19, 7, 26] , as well as interactive arguments [1, 42, 17, 21, 6] . Interestingly, limited work has been devoted to amplification of public-key encryption. The problem was first considered by Dwork, Naor, and Reingold [13] for CPA-secure public-key encryption. Constructions achieving better parameters were later proposed by Holenstein [24] and by Holenstein and Renner [25] . However, the question of amplifying CCA security has remained wide open ever since. This is the question that we tackle and solve in this work. 1 Modeling weak CCA encryption. Our model of weak CCA encryption extends naturally the model of weak CPA encryption considered in [13, 25] . We start from a bit-encryption 2 scheme with key generation algorithm Gen, encryption algorithm Enc, and decryption algorithm Dec, and weaken it in two different directions, allowing both for non-negligible decryption errors as well as for non-negligible adversarial advantage in a chosen-ciphertext attack. More concretely, for two given parameters 0 < α, β ≤ 1, where α ≥ 1/p(κ) and β < 1 − 1/q(κ) for some polynomials p and q, we assume the following two conditions:
(i) α-weak decryptability: The decryption error over a random key-pair and a random bit is at most 1−α 2 , i.e. Pr (pk, sk) $ ← Gen, b $ ← {0, 1} : Dec(sk, Enc(pk, b)) = b ≥ 1+α 2 . We stress that this is a very weak guarantee, as it is taken over random choices of the keys and of the bit b, as well as of the coins used to encrypt b.
(ii) β-weak security: We consider the usual CCA-security game where an adversary obtains first the public key, and later a challenge ciphertext encrypting a random bit b. Moreover, the adversary can ask arbitrary decryption queries, with the sole exception that after the adversary obtains the challenge ciphertext, it cannot ask for its decryption. The task of the adversary is to output a guess b , and we are going to require that Pr [b = b] ≤ 1+β 2 for all polynomial-size adversaries.
Justifying weak CCA security. There are several reasons why assuming the existence of such a weak scheme is reasonable. Let us mention some natural examples.
-Within the general agenda of achieving CCA security from general assumptions, we may envision that a construction of a weak CCA scheme is potentially much easier to find than a construction of a full-fledged CCA-secure encryption scheme. -An existing scheme designed to be CCA-secure may end up being less secure than expected due to the discovery of a better concrete attack or due to implementation errors, as in the recently discussed case of faulty key generation for RSA-based systems [34, 22] . -It may be generally easier to build a CCA-secure scheme with large decryption errors. For example, as pointed out in [32] , an encryption scheme with a simple, easily learnable, decryption algorithm must have large decryption error. In contrast to CPA encryption, reducing the decryption error turns out to be a major challenge in the case of CCA encryption, even if the scheme is already fully CCA secure.
Our main result. The question we are going to ask is whether for a certain α, β, there exists a transformation which delivers a CCA-secure encryption scheme from any scheme which has α-weak decryptability and β-weak security. We provide an affirmative answer to this question.
Theorem 1 (Main theorem, informal). If α 2 > β, there exists a black-box construction transforming any scheme with α-weak decryptability and β-weak security into a CCA-secure encryption scheme with negligible decryption error.
We cannot rule out that constructions achieving a wider range of parameters α and β exist. In fact, we remark that the problem of determining the optimal parameters is open even in the simpler case of amplifying weak CPA security. While the constraint α 2 > β is shown [25] to be necessary for a restricted class of CPA black-box amplifiers, we see little value in extending this result to CCA security, as our amplifier itself is not within this class.
Our techniques
We now turn to a high-level overview of our techniques to amplify weak CCA encryption. Our approach relies on different existing techniques, which we are going to extend, such as those for simultaneously amplifying weak correctness and weak CPA security [25] , and those for extending the message space of CCA-secure encryption schemes [39, 23] . We start by reviewing these works, before turning to a description of our two main new techniques, namely hardcore lemmas for CCA-security and heavyciphertext pre-sampling, and how they are used.
Amplification of CPA encryption. Given a public-key bit-encryption scheme PKE with α-weak decryptability and β-weak security with respect to chosen-plaintext attacks, the Holenstein-Renner (HR) construction [25] produces a fully CPA-secure encryption scheme with negligible decryption error. To encrypt each message m, the HR construction invokes the basic bit-encryption scheme PKE to encrypt several fresh random bits b 1 , · · · , b n under n public keys pk 1 , · · · , pk n , producing ciphertexts c 1 , · · · , c n ; the bits b 1 , · · · , b n are then carefully "combined" to generate a one-time-pad k for hiding the actual message m, as well as some additional ciphertext component c ; the additional component c is used by the legitimate receiver, given the secret keys, to reconstruct the one-time pad, but it should not leak any information about k to the adversary. The final ciphertext is c = (c 1 , . . . , c n , c , m ⊕ k).
The reason why such a combiner can exist is that the probability that the legitimate receiver, given the secret keys, can learn each individual bit b i from c i is (1 + α)/2, which we expect to be sufficiently larger than the probability that the adversary learns b i from c i without the secret keys. To make this intuition sound, one uses Impagliazzo's hardcore lemma [28] and its tighter version by Holenstein [24] : It implies that if PKE is β-weakly CPA secure, then, for each i, with probability 1 − β (over the choice of b i , the randomness for sampling pk i and encrypting b i ), the encryption of b i is a "hard instance", meaning that given its encryption c i , the bit b i is (computationally) indistinguishable from a random independent bit. This gap between what an honest decryptor and an eavesdropper can recover can be leveraged by an information-theoretically secure one-way key-agreement protocol as in the setting of Maurer [35] , which turns out to provide directly the right type of combiner.
From bit CCA encryption to string CCA encryption. It is well known that a CPA-secure string encryption scheme can be built from a CPA-secure bit-encryption scheme via simple parallel encryption of each bit. However, this approach does not lift to extending the message space of CCAsecure bit encryption, as an adversary can easily maul a challenge ciphertext c 1 · · · c i · · · c n of a n-bit string b 1 · · · b i · · · b n into another ciphertext c 1 · · · c i · · · c n of a related string b 1 · · · 0 · · · b n , and thus win in the CCA security game-additional structure is needed to retain CCA security. Myers and shelat [39] showed that although this approach is not CCA secure, it satisfies a weaker adaptive security property-called UCCA security-which requires indistinguishability to hold for adversaries that can query a decryption oracle on any ciphertext c 1 , · · · , c n of their choice, except those that "quote" the challenge ciphertext, denoted as c * 1 , · · · , c * n , at any of its components, that is c i = c * i for some i. Then, Myers and shelat, and later Hohenberger, Lewko, and Waters (HLW) [23] , showed how to construct a string CCA-secure scheme PKE from such a UCCA-secure string encryption scheme PKE s . 3 Here we briefly review the HLW construction. It uses PKE s as an inner encryption scheme PKE in = PKE s and two outer schemes PKE out,1 , PKE out,2 that are CCA-1 and CPA secure respectively. To encrypt a message m, the encryption algorithm proceeds by encrypting m together with two random strings r out,1 and r out,2 into an inner ciphertext c in = Enc in (pk in , (m, r out,1 , r out,2 )); it then encrypts the inner ciphertext into two outer ciphertexts (c out,1 , c out,2 ) using r out,1 and r out,2 respectively as the randomness for encryption, that is, c out,i = Enc out,i (pk out,i , c in ; r out,i ) for i = 1, 2; the final ciphertext is simply (c out,1 , c out,2 ). At a high level, the two outer schemes prevent the adversary from issuing a decryption query for a ciphertext whose embedded inner ciphertext "quotes" that in the challenge ciphertext, hence reducing CCA to UCCA security.
Our Approach. A seemingly plausible attempt for constructing a CCA-secure encryption scheme from a weak scheme PKE with α-decryptability and β-weak CCA-security is to first try to show that the HR construction PKE , when instantiated with PKE as the basic bit-encryption scheme, is UCCA secure, and subsequently plugging PKE as the inner encryption scheme into the HLW construction PKE, and show that it yields a CCA-secure encryption scheme.
Unfortunately, we encounter the following two challenges: First, it is unclear whether the weak CCA security of PKE is amplified through the construction of PKE to UCCA security; in particular, known hardcore lemmas [28, 24] only hold for games where the challenger is stateless, but the challenger in the CCA security game is stateful (it changes its behavior before and after the challenge ciphertext is generated). Second, it turns out that the security proof of the HLW construction requires the basic scheme PKE to have "unpredictability"-that is, a random cipheretxt (of a random bit) of PKE has high entropy and is almost impossible to blindly guess-which holds trivially for any fully-secure CPA encryption scheme with negligible decryption error, but is not satisfied by a weak CCA encryption scheme.
Overcoming these two difficulties turns out to be quite challenging and requires the adoption of new techniques, for which we now provide a high-level overview.
Step 1: The Hardcore Lemma for CCA security and XCCA security. To overcome the first difficulty, we prove a variant of Impagliazzo's hardcore lemma which applies to CCA security (Theorem 2 below): It implies that if a scheme is weakly β-CCA-secure, then with probability 1 − β (over the randomness for choosing a random plaintext bit, for key generation, and for encryption), given an encryption of a random bit b, b is indistinguishable from a random independent bit even to adversaries with access to the decryption oracle. Our new hardcore lemma can be used to prove that PKE satisfies an even stronger adaptive security property than UCCA, called XCCA (read as "cross"-CCA), which guarantees indistinguishability even for adversaries with access to decryption oracles that decrypts ciphertext of the basic scheme PKE under each individual component key of PKE , subject to the restriction that the decryption oracle for the i-th component does not answer queries that "quote" the corresponding component in the challenge ciphertext. As we will see shortly, this stronger security guarantee is quintessential for overcoming the second difficulty.
Finally, rather than presenting a direct proof of the hardcore lemma for CCA security, we provide a general characterization of games for which hardcore lemmas exist, which extends beyond games for which such lemmas are known [28, 24, 47] . Our hardcore lemma for CCA-security is then simply derived as a special case. We believe this step to be of independent interest.
Step 2: From XCCA security to CCA security. We prove that the CCA security of PKE can be based on the stronger XCCA security of the inner encryption PKE , even if the underlying basic scheme PKE is not sufficiently "unpredictable" -in contrast to the proof in [23] . This requires a substantially different analysis than the one of [23] , and in particular a new reduction. Concretely, we overcome lack of unpredictability by introducing a new technique called heavy-ciphertext pre-sampling. Roughly speaking, this technique allows the security reduction (from CCA security of PKE to XCCA security of PKE ) to proactively predict and decrypt all highly likely ciphertexts of PKE, and the challenging task is to prove that these are the only components of the inner challenge ciphertext an adversary may indeed easily "quote" after seeing the challenge ciphertext.
Preliminaries
We start by introducing some basic notations, and then move to reviewing definitions for publickey encryption schemes, their correctness and their security. We review some basic constructions and techniques to deal with encryption schemes in Appendix A.
Basic concepts and notation
Throughout this paper, a function f : N → [0, 1] is negligible if it vanishes faster than the inverse of any polynomial p, i.e., for all c > 0 there exists κ c such that f (κ) ≤ κ −c for all κ ≥ κ c . The probability distribution of a random variable X is usually denoted as P X , and we occasionally use the shorthand P X (x) for Pr [X = x]. Adversaries are going to be modeled as non-uniform families of (randomized) circuits for ease of exposition, but all results extend with some work to the uniform setting, as we occasionally point out.
Weak and Strong CCA Secure Encryption
A public-key encryption scheme with message space M ⊆ {0, 1} * is a triple PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec), where (i) Gen is the (randomized) key generation algorithm, outputting a pair (pk, sk) consisting of a public-and a secret-key, respectively (ii) Enc is the (randomized) encryption algorithm outputting a ciphertext c = Enc(pk, m) for any message m ∈ M and a valid public key pk; and (iii) Dec is the deterministic decryption algorithm such that Dec(sk, c) ∈ M ∪ {⊥}. All algorithms additionally take (implicitly) as input the security parameter 1 κ in unary form, and the message space M may also depend on the security parameter κ. Whenever M = {0, 1}, we say that the scheme is a bit-encryption scheme. We sometimes need to make the randomness used by Gen and Enc explicit: In these cases, we write Gen(r) and Enc(pk, m; r) to highlight the fact that random coins r are used to generate keys by Gen and to encrypt the message m, respectively.
Correctness of PKE. Throughout this paper, we say that the encryption scheme PKE with message space M has decryption error δ if Pr (pk, sk) $ ← Gen, m $ ← M : Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m)) = m ≤ δ, where the probability is additionally over the random coins of Enc. Moreover, we say that a scheme is almost perfectly correct, if for an overwhelming fraction of randomness r used by the key generation algorithm, for (pk, sk) = Gen(r), and all messages m ∈ M, we have Pr [Dec(sk, Enc(pk, m)) = m] = 1.
Security of PKE.
In general, security of the scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) is defined via the following security game involving a challenger and an adversary A:
Game CCA2 A PKE :
(i) The challenger generates (pk, sk) We refer to decryption queries in phase (ii) and (iv) as before-the-fact and after-the-fact decryption queries, respectively. Moreover, in the case that PKE is a bit-encryption scheme we assume without loss of generality that (m 0 , m 1 ) = (0, 1), and hence Enc(pk, b) is the challenge ciphertext. We also define the CCA2-advantage of the adversary A as Adv CCA2 PKE (A) = 2 · Pr [b = b] − 1. We say that an encryption scheme is CCA-secure if Adv CCA2 PKE (A) is negligible for all polynomial-size adversaries A. We say it is q-CCA-secure if this holds for adversaries making at most q decryption queries, whereas it is CPA-secure if it is 0-CCA-secure. The following notation will also be convenient. Definition 1. For α, β ∈ [0, 1], a bit-encryption scheme PKE is (α, β)-CCA-secure if the following two properties hold: (i) PKE has decryption error (1 − α)/2, and (ii) For any polynomial-size adversary A, we have Adv CCA2 PKE (A) ≤ β.
In passing, we point out that CPA-secure encryption with negligible decryption error implies one-way functions [30] , and in turn implies pseudorandom generators [20] , all in a black-box way.
3 Hardness Amplification and the Hardcore Lemma for CCA Security
Informally speaking, Impagliazzo's Hardcore Lemma [28] asserts that if for a predicate P it is mildly hard to compute P (x) on a random input x given side information f (x) (i.e., say this can be done with probability at most 1+ε 2 ), then there must exist a sufficiently large subset S (the "hardcore set") of the inputs such that when sampling x from S, it is infeasible to predict P (x ) from f (x ) noticeably better than by random guessing. A tight proof where the set S contains a (1 − ε)-fraction of the inputs was given by Holenstein [24] . The main contribution of this section is deriving a similar statement for (weak) CCA-secure encryption to be used in the analysis of our construction of a CCA-secure encryption scheme later.
Recently, Tessaro [47] gave a hardcore lemma for interactive primitives, which is however not sufficient to capture CCA security, as it only considers challengers with state independent of the interaction. Here, in contrast, we present a new abstraction of existing proofs of hardcore lemmas, which is of independent interest. Not only we apply it to derive the hardcore lemma for CCA security of bit-encryption, but it also yields previous more restricted statements [28, 47] as special cases.
Bit-guessing games. Let us took a more abstract look at games (such as the CCA-security game) where the adversary is asked to guess a bit. Formally, we describe a bit-guessing game as a tuple G = (P X , C, P ), where P X is a probability distribution with support X , C is an interactive stateful machine taking an auxiliary input x ∈ X , and P : X → {0, 1} is a predicate. Combined with an adversary A, G defines the following game: First, an input x $ ← P X is sampled. The game then continues with the interaction between the challenger C(x) and an adversary A, which then outputs a bit b $ ← A C(x) (here the oracle C(x) keeps state). The goal of the adversary is to guess the bit P (x). In particular, we define the G-advantage of A relative to a distribution P as
We say that G is (s, ε)-hard if Adv G P X (A) ≤ ε for all s-size adversaries A. Definitions extend naturally to the asymptotic setting.
Hardcore lemmas and measures. A measure M for a bit-guessing game G is a mapping M :
We ask the question of which bit-guessing games admit a hardcore measure: Assuming the game G is ε-hard for some ε ∈ [0, 1], we seek for a measure M with large density (e.g. µ(M) ≥ 1 − ε) such that conditioned on the associated event E, the game G is very hard to win. In [47] , a proof that this is true for the case where C(x) is stateless for each x was given. Our new approach extends this to possibly stateful challengers, as in the case of CCA security.
Abstract hardcore lemmas. We give a simple sufficient condition on a bit-guessing game G = (P X , C, P ) to admit a hardcore lemma. The condition is formulated in terms of the ability, for any given x, to estimate the probability that a binary-output adversary for G, sampled according to a given distribution over circuits, outputs one when run on C(x). In particular, we call an oracle O a size s circuit sampler for G if, upon each invocation, it returns the description of a valid adversary A for G of size s. For each such O, we define p O,G 1 (x) as the probability that a randomly sampled adversary A $ ← O outputs one when run with C(x), i.e.,
The following definition captures the notion of a good estimation algorithm for p G,O 1 (x) which can only interact with C(x) and obtain samples from O, bur does not learn x and must be equally successful on all such x.
Definition 2 (p 1 -estimator). Let G = (P X , C, P ) be a bit-guessing game. Then, a (s, s , q, γ, η)-p 1estimator for G is a size s circuit E outputting a real number in [0, 1], such that for all size-s circuit samplers O, for all x, and with
Note that in particular q · s ≤ s. The following theorem relates the existence of a hardcore lemma for a certain game G with the existence of a p 1 -sampler for G. Its proof abstracts the ones of [24, 47] for special cases, and is deferred to Appendix B.
The hardcore lemma for CCA-security. We are now going to show a hardcore lemma for CCAsecurity as an application of Proposition 1. Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a public-key bit encryption scheme such that Gen and Enc take randomness of lengths ρ Gen and ρ Enc , respectively. Formally, we consider the bit-guessing game CCA2[PKE] = (P X , CCA, P ) where P X is the uniform distribution on {0, 1} ρ Gen × {0, 1} ρ Enc × {0, 1}, whereas CCA(r Gen , r Enc , b) is the challenger for the CCA-security game for PKE with challenge bit b, public key and secret key (pk, sk) = Gen(r Gen ), and challenge ciphertext c * = Enc(pk, b; r Enc ). Moreover, we define P (r Gen , r Enc , b) = b. The following lemma gives an appropriate p 1 -estimator for CCA2[PKE]. Proof. The estimator E, given pk from CCA, runs sequentially each of B 1 , . . . , B q on input pk until they output their query (0, 1). All before-the-fact decryption queries are answered using the challenger CCA. It then obtains a challenge ciphertext c * , and then resumes the execution of B i 's from the last state before outputting (0, 1), again using the challenger to reply to decryption queries. Finally, let b i be the output of B i ; the estimator E outputs the
The error is at most γ with probability at most η by the Chernoff bound.
We stress that the above lemma is only true for bit-encryption. Should we consider a larger set of messages, each B i could ask a different message pair, and the above estimation technique would fail.
The following theorem is a simple combination of Proposition 1 and Lemma 1.
Theorem 2 (Hardcore Lemma for CCA Security). Let α, β ∈ [0, 1], and let s ∈ N. Moreover, let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a public-key encryption scheme with message space {0, 1}, and assume that Adv CCA2 PKE (A) ≤ β for all s-size adversaries A. Then, for all γ > 0, there exists a measure M such that µ(M) ≥ 1 − β, and Adv
Some remarks. We provide some important remarks on extensions of the above results. Remark 1. We remark that the above results are for the non-uniform setting. This makes the presentation of the main ideas somewhat simpler, but we note that the abstract hardcore lemma above extends to uniform security following the approach of [24] , provided one can efficiently simulate the interaction between an adversary and the given challenger.
Remark 2. Games where C(x) is stateless for each x easily yield a good sampler via sequential repetition, and therefore the results of [28, 24, 47] all easily follow from the abstract hardcore lemma.
Remark 3. Without giving further detail, we briefly point out that [47] provides a stronger result for the case where C(x) is possibly not efficient, as e.g. |x| is exponentially large, yet the interaction between an adversary and C(x) for a random x is efficiently simulatable; this won't be necessary here, but similar techniques can be applied.
From Weak to Strong CCA Security: The Construction and its Security
In this section, we present our construction to transform an (α, β)-CCA encryption scheme into a fully CCA-secure encryption scheme. We start by reviewing some information-theoretic tools underlying our construction, before turning to its description and security.
Information-theoretically secure key-agreement
We consider the problem of two parties, Alice and Bob, agreeing on a secret key with unconditional security in a setting where they each hold values X 1 , . . . X n and Y 1 . . . , Y n , respectively, in presence of an adversary obtaining values Z 1 , . . . , Z n ; in particular, (X i , Y i , Z i ) are sampled independently from a given tripartite probability distributions P XY Z for all i = 1, . . . , n. That is, (X i , Y i , Z i ) are possibly correlated for each i, but independent across distinct indices i = j. Moreover, Alice and Bob are connected via an authenticated channel, allowing them to exchange messages, which is however wiretapped by the adversary. The problem of secret-key agreement in this setting was first considered by Maurer [35] . Here, we consider the special case where the channel only allows one-way communication from Alice to Bob. The following definition formally captures such a protocol.
Definition 3 (One-way key-agreement). Let ε, δ : N → [0, 1], and let n, : N → N be monotonically increasing functions. Moreover, let P = {P κ } κ∈N be a family of sets of tripartite probability distribution P XY Z . An (P, ε, δ, n, )-one-way key agreement protocol is a probabilistic polynomial-time protocol OKA = (KAEnc, KADec) such that for all κ ∈ N, all P XY Z ∈ P κ , and for independent samples (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ), . . . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) $ ← P XY Z (where n = n(κ)), the following two properties hold:
Correctness. With probability 1 − δ(κ), both parties output the same key, i.e.,
, and SD denotes statistical distance.
In the following for some α, β : N → [0, 1], we consider a special set D(α, β) of tripartite probability distributions introduced by Holenstein and Renner [25] .
, and (iii) there exists an event E, defined on (X, Z), such that Pr X = 0 Z = z, E = Pr X = 1 Z = z, E = 1 2 for all z, and Pr [E] ≥ 1 − β(κ).
We now discuss feasibility of one-way KA protocols for D(α, β). The following was proved by Holenstein and Renner [25] and will be useful below. We give an asymptotic reformulation. Proposition 2. Let α, β : N → [0, 1] be such that α 2 > β + Ω(1), and let : N → N be a polynomial function. Then, there exists a polynomial-time (D(α, β), ε, δ, n, )-one-way KA protocol such that n(κ) = 1 7 · (κ) · (α 2 − β − O(1)) and moreover, ε(κ) is negligible in n(κ), and δ(κ) = 2 −Θ(n(κ)) . There is no a-priori reason why α 2 and β could not be closer, yet no better gap can be proven given existing constructions of capacity-achieving error-correcting codes. In the error-free case, however, the following better result is proven in Appendix C.
Proposition 3. Let p be a polynomial, ε : N → [0, 1], and : N → N be a polynomial function. Then, there exists a D(1,
The main construction
Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a bit-encryption scheme which is (α, β)-secure. Assuming the existence of an information-theoretically secure one-way key agreement protocol for D(α, β), we present a construction of a CCA-secure public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec), with message length = (κ) and negligible decryption error, which makes black-box use of the basic scheme PKE.
At the highest level, our construction PKE follows the paradigm recently proposed by Hohenberger, Lewko, and Waters [23] . In particular, it consists of an inner scheme PKE in = (Gen in , Enc in , Dec in ) and two outer schemes PKE out,1 = (Gen out,1 , Enc out,1 , Dec out,1 ) and PKE out,2 = (Gen out,2 , Enc out,2 , Dec out,2 ), all three of which will be built from PKE, and specified below. For ∈ {in, (out, 1), (out, 2)}, let us further denote by , ρ and t the message, randomness, and ciphertext lengths of PKE , respectively. We are going to require in = + ρ out,1 + ρ out,2 as well as out,1 = out,2 = t in . A formal description of PKE is given in Figure 1 , on the left: We encrypt the message m, together with two random values r out,1 and r out,2 , obtaining an inner ciphertext c in , which is then encrypted twice with the two outer schemes, using r out,1 and r out,2 as the respective random coins. Decryption recovers the message by decrypting the ciphertext via Dec out,1 and Dec in using the corresponding secret keys, and then checks validity of the ciphertext by re-encrypting the inner ciphertext using the public keys and the recovered random coins.
We now turn to describing the construction of the component schemes PKE in , PKE out,1 and PKE out,2 from the basic scheme PKE.
The inner scheme. Let OKA = (KAEnc, KADec) be a (D(α, β), ε, δ, n, in )-one-way key agreement protocol such that ε and δ are negligible, and known (recall that PKE is (α, β)-CCA secure). We define PKE in = (Gen in , Enc in , Dec in ) as in Figure 1 , on the right: It behaves as the construction from [25] to amplify security and correctness of a weak CPA-secure encryption scheme. (We will prove below that it actually achieves stronger security when using an (α, β)-CCA secure encryption scheme.) It encrypts random bits b 1 , . . . , b n with the basic scheme, and then generates a session key k via KAEnc(b 1 , . . . , b n ), and a ciphertext c , and uses the key k as an one-time pad. Decryption via KADec is then obvious. It is easy to see that the decryption error of this scheme is inherited from OKA, i.e., it is upper bounded by exactly δ.
The outer schemes. We now instantiate the two outer schemes. The following description is fairly high-level, but sufficient to fully specify the construction. We refer the reader unfamiliar with the basic components to Appendix A for a self-contained review.
We first derive a CPA-secure public-key encryption scheme PKE ,ρ out with message length = poly(κ) and randomness length ρ = ω(log(κ)) from the basic scheme PKE which also enjoys almost-perfect correctness: 4 1. We use the same construction as in PKE in to achieve a CPA-secure scheme PKE out , with message length truncated to 1-bit. CPA-security of the resulting scheme follows from the proof in [25] or from the stronger Lemma 2 below. Let ρ be the randomness length of PKE out .
Scheme PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec):
-Return (pk = (pk in , pk out,1 , pk out,2 ), sk = (sk in , sk out,1 , pk out,1 , pk out,2 )).
Encryption Enc(pk, m):
Decryption Dec(sk, c = c out,1 c out 2 ):
-c in ← Dec out,1 (sk out,1 , c out,1 ) -m r out,1 r out,2 ← Dec in (sk in , c in ) -If Enc out,i (pk out,i , c in ; r out,i ) = c out,i for i = 1, 2 then return m, else return ⊥.
Scheme PKE in = (Gen in , Enc in , Dec in ):
Key generation Gen in (1 κ ): -(pk 1 , sk 1 ), . . . , (pk n , sk n ) $ ← Gen(1 κ ) -Return (pk = (pk 1 , . . . , pk n ), sk = (sk 1 , . . . , sk n )).
Encryption Enc in (pk, m):
Decryption Dec in (sk, c = (c 1 , . . . , c n , c , c )): 2. For δ being the decryption error of PKE out , we apply the transformation given in Appendix A by Lemma 4 to enforce almost-perfect correctness, reducing randomness length to ρ = 1 4 ·log(1/δ(κ)) = ω(log(κ)) via a PRG G : {0, 1} ρ → {0, 1} ρ , whose existence is implied by the existence of PKE out in a black-box fashion [30, 20] . 3. We then use parallel repetition of copies of PKE out to obtain PKE ,ρ out , possibly using a PRG again to shorten the overall randomness length to ρ.
We are going to let PKE out,2 = PKE out,2 ,ρ out,2 out , whereas to obtain the first outer scheme PKE out,1 , we are going to invoke Theorem 4 based on PKE out,1 ,ρ out (for some ρ = poly(κ)), and then finally use a PRG to reduce the randomness length to ρ out,1 . The resulting scheme is then 1-CCA secure, and is almost-perfectly correct.
CCA Security of PKE
We turn to our main result and show that our construction PKE is indeed CCA secure. Theorem 3. Let ε and δ be two negligible functions. Assume that PKE is (α, β)-CCA-secure, and OKA is a (D(α, β), ε, δ, n, in )-one-way key-agreement protocol. Then, PKE is a CCA-secure encryption scheme with negligible decryption error.
In particular, by Propositions 2 and 3, we achieve amplification whenever α 2 > β + Ω(1), and whenever α = 1 and β < 1 − 1 p(κ) for some polynomial p. Overview of the Security Proof. Towards showing the CCA security of PKE, we first show that it follows from Theorem 2 that the inner encryption scheme PKE in satisfies a strong adaptive security property, which we refer to as XCCA (to be read as "cross"-CCA) security. We are then going to reduce the CCA security of PKE to the XCCA security of PKE in using the 1-CCA security of PKE out,1 and the CPA security of PKE out,2 , combined with their almost perfect correctness. This second step resembles the proof of [23] only at a first glance, as it will require a completely different technique to handle the fact that ciphertexts of the basic scheme PKE are not sufficiently unpredictable.
Before proceeding to describing the two steps in more details, we first describe the XCCA security game. For simplicity, here we only define the XCCA game w.r.t. the concrete scheme PKE in ; one can easily generalize the definition to a larger class of encryption schemes whose ciphertext contains multiple component ciphertexts of a base encryption scheme, similarly to [39] ; we omit the details here. The game proceeds almost identically to the CCA game except that instead of having access to the decryption oracle for the whole encryption scheme, the adversary has access to the decryption oracles of the basic encryption scheme PKE using each of the component secret keys; the i'th decryption oracle using the i'th component secret key is denoted as Dec(sk[i], ·). As a result, the adversary cannot make any after-the-fact decryption queries that is the same as any of the component ciphertexts encrypted using one of the component public keys pk[i] in the challenge ciphertext. Similar to the CCA game, we define the XCCA-advantage of the adversary A as Adv XCCA PKE in (A) = 2 · Pr [b = b] − 1. We say that PKE in is XCCA-secure if no polynomial sized adversary can achieve a non-negligible advantage in the XCCA game.
We remark that the XCCA game is closely related to the notion of UCCA security defined in [39] , and the similar notion of DCCA security in [23] : In comparison, in the UCCA security game w.r.t. PKE in , the adversary only has access to the decryption oracle of the whole encryption scheme, but is not allowed to make any after-the-fact query that quotes any of the component ciphertexts in the challenge ciphertext (in DCCA a more fine grained control on disallowed queries is considered). As we will see shortly, the stronger security guarantee given by XCCA is crucial for our proof to succeed.
With the definition of the XCCA game in mind, the remainder of the proof proceeds via the following two lemmas. Lemma 2. Let ε and δ be two negligible functions. Assume that PKE is (α, β)-secure, and OKA is a (D(α, β), ε, δ, n, in )-one-way KA protocol. Then, PKE in is XCCA-secure.
Lemma 3. Assume that PKE in , PKE out,1 and PKE out,2 are respectively XCCA, 1-CCA and CPA secure, and PKE out,1 and PKE out,2 have almost-perfect correctness, then PKE is CCA secure.
We now turn to describing the high level ideas behind the proofs of both lemmas, and defer their formal proofs to Appendices D and E, respectively.
Proof Sketch of Lemma 2:
We are going to use the hardcore lemma for CCA-security (Theorem 2) to show that PKE in is XCCA secure. Informally speaking, in the XCCA game, with respect to each random bit b i used to generate the component c i of the challenge ciphertext, the adversary is participating in an independently and randomly executed CCA game for PKE: Indeed, each random bit b i is encrypted using an independently and randomly chosen public key pk[i] and random coins, and the adversary has access to the decryption oracle Dec(sk[i], ·). Thus, by the hardcore lemma, each of these CCA games has probability 1 − β of delivering an "hard instance", and thus the corresponding bit b i remains hidden to the adversary, i.e., it looks (pseudo-)random with probability 1 − β. More precisely, each triple
is computationally indistinguishability from a sample from a valid distribution from D(α, β). In this case, then it simply follows from the fact that OKA is a (D(α, β), ε, δ, n, in )-one-way key agreement scheme that the key k output by KAEnc(b 1 , · · · , b n ) remains random and thus the message m b is hidden. Proof Sketch of Lemma 3: We base the CCA security of PKE on the XCCA security of PKE in via a black-box reduction. At a high level, the reduction B participates in the XCCA game for PKE in and internally emulates the CCA game for PKE to a CCA-adversary A succeeding with non-negligible advantage γ as follows:
-It receives the public key pk in the XCCA game and internally generates the public key pk by sampling key pairs (pk out,1 , sk out,1 ) and (pk out,2 , sk out,2 ) for the two outer schemes to produce pk = (pk, pk out,1 , pk out,2 ) and gives it to A. -To emulate the challenge ciphertext c * of PKE that encrypts either m 0 or m 1 chosen by A in the emulated CCA game, B first chooses random r out,1 and r out,2 , and obtains the challenge ciphertext c * in of PKE in that encrypts m b r out,1 r out,2 for a random b ∈ {0, 1} chosen in the XCCA game. It then produces c * honestly by encrypting c * out,1 = Enc out,1 (c * in ; r out,1 ) and c * out,2 = Enc out,2 (c * in ; r out,2 ). -Finally, it emulates the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) for A by using the secret key sk out,1 it sampled itself, as well as the decryption oracles {Dec(sk[i], ·)} i∈[n] in the XCCA game.
It is easy to see that as long as A does not ask any after-the-fact queries whose inner ciphertext (embedded in the first outer ciphertext) "quotes" the inner challenge ciphertexts c * in , i.e., it does not share a common component ciphertext, B always decrypts queries from A perfectly and consequently also emulates the view of A perfectly.
It is therefore tempting to try to show that the probability that A "quotes" is negligible. Indeed, this is the approach taken by [39, 23] . The rationale in their proof is that if the basic scheme PKE has unpredictability -a random ciphertext of a random bit has high entropy and is hard to blindly guess -then the fact that A manages to quote would violate the 1-CCA security of the first outer scheme or the CPA-security of the second outer scheme. In [23] , a series of hybrids is used to remove the circular dependence between the inner challenge ciphertext and the randomness used in its two outer encryptions, and move to a setting where A's view is statistically independent from the inner challenge ciphertext, but the quoting probability is negligibly close to the original one. One can then easily show that unpredictability of PKE yields that quoting occurs with negligible probability only.
Unfortunately, this approach fails completely in our setting, as our basic encryption scheme PKE does not ensure unpredictability; in fact, it is possible to build an (α, β)-CCA-secure scheme where ciphertexts have very low min-entropy. We address this via a new technique, called heavy ciphertext pre-sampling: We observe that if A can blindly guess some component ciphertext c i in c * in , then c i is a ciphertext value which appears with sufficiently large probability when encrypting a random bit under pk[i]. Hence, we can hope that the same value is hit by the reduction B by simply generating a large number of random encryptions (of random bits) of PKE under pk[i]; call these pre-sampled ciphertexts. Since the component ciphertexts in c * in are generated identically to the pre-sampled ciphertexts, the probability that A's guess collides with the former is the same as the probability it collides with any of the pre-sampled ciphertexts. Setting the size of the pre-sampling large enough, say poly(1/ε), the reduction can exhaust all the component ciphertexts that A may "quote" with probability 1 − ε, for any ε. Furthermore, due to the strong security provided by the XCCA game, the reduction B, with access to the decryption oracles of the component ciphertexts, can obtain the decrypted values of these pre-sampled ciphertexts before-the-fact. This is crucial, since even if we know that a ciphertext is obtained by encrypting some bit d, its actual decryption could well be equal 1 − d due to the weak α-correctness.
Intuitively this solves the problem, as whenever A makes an after-the-fact query that "quotes" c * in , B can still decrypt by using either the external decryption oracles (for components that do not quote) or the decrypted values of the pre-sampled ciphertexts (for these that quote). This will allow us to show that B succeeds in emulating the view of A with high probability, and thus the CCA security of PKE reduces to the XCCA security of PKE in .
A Basic Tools
We reviews some basic constructions in the realm of secure encryption that are known from the literature, and that are going to be used throughout the paper.
From one-bit to multi-bit CPA security. Let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be a CPA-secure bitencryption scheme with negligible decryption error. Then, the following construction PKE is a CPAsecure encryption scheme with -bit message space (we omit the simple standard proof via a hybrid argument). Key generation produces a public-key / secret-key pair (pk, sk), were (pk[i], sk[i]) are obtained by running Gen with independent randomness. Encryption of an -bit message m is defined as Enc (pk, m) = Enc(pk [1] , m 1 ) · · · Enc(pk[ ], m ), where m 1 , . . . , m are the bits of m. Decryption is obvious. Note that if PKE is almost-perfectly correct, then so is PKE .
From CPA to 1-CCA security. We will invoke the following result by Cramer et al [8] to build a 1-CCA secure encryption scheme from a CPA-secure one.
Theorem 4 ([8]
). There exists an efficient black-box construction of a 1-CCA secure public-key encryption scheme with negligible decryption error from any CPA-secure encryption scheme with negligible decryption error. Moreover, if the underlying CPA-secure scheme is almost-perfectly correct, then the resulting 1-CCA secure scheme is also almost perfectly correct.
From negligible error to almost-perfect correctness. We review a technique by Dwork, Naor, and Reingold [13] to increase correctness of schemes with negligible decryption error to almostperfect security via sparsification of the randomness space.
Concretely, let PKE = (Gen, Enc, Dec) be an encryption scheme with message space {0, 1} m(κ) and randomness length ρ(κ). Fix now ρ such that ρ (κ) ≤ ρ(κ) for all κ. We construct a new public-key encryption scheme PKE = (Gen , Enc , Dec ), using a PRG G : {0, 1} ρ (κ) → {0, 1} ρ(κ) as follows. First, we have Gen , on input 1 κ , generates (pk, sk) ← Gen(1 κ ) as well as a random string r $ ← {0, 1} ρ(κ) . The public key is then pk = (pk, r), whereas the secret key is sk = sk. In particular we have Dec = Dec. Moreover, we have Enc ((pk, r), m) first generates r $ ← {0, 1} ρ , and then outputs Enc(pk, m; G(r )⊕r). Proof. It follows directly from the fact that PKE has decryption error δ that for all r ∈ {0, 1} ρ (κ) the following inequality holds.
Pr (pk, sk)
as G(r ) ⊕ r is a uniformly distributed random ρ(κ)-bit string. Therefore, by a union bound we have that,
Now, the probability that (pk, sk) and r are chosen such that there exists x and r with an decryption error, that is, Dec(sk, Enc(pk, x; G(r ) ⊕ r)) = x is upper bounded by
This concludes the proof for correctness. The statement about security follows from PRG security of G, since G(r ) ⊕ r is pseudorandom.
B Proof of the Abstract Hardcore Lemma (Proposition 1)
Proof (of Proposition 1). Let us fix γ > 0, and assume towards a contradiction that an (s, s , q, γ(1 − ε)/4, γ(1 − ε)/4)-p 1 -estimator E for G exists, yet the claim of the proposition is false. That is, for all measures M with µ(M) ≥ 1 − ε, there exists an s -size adversary B with Adv G P M (B) > γ. We can think of this situation in terms of the following two-player zero-sum game. Player 1 chooses as its pure strategy a deterministic adversary B of size s , whereas Player 2 chooses as its pure strategy a measure M such that µ(M) = 1 − ε and M(x) ∈ {0, 1} for all, except at most one, x. The payoff for M and B is then exactly Pr x
It is easy to see that both sets of pure strategies are finite. Given mixed strategies defined by probability distributions p 1 and p 2 over pure strategies, it is easy to verify that their expected payoff equals
where O 1 is an s -size circuit sampler sampling B with probability p 1 (B), whereas M 2 is such that M 2 (x) = M p 2 (M) · M(x), and has again density µ(M 2 ) ≥ 1 − ε.
The above assumption of the proposition being false tells us that for every mixed strategy of Player 2 there exists a pure strategy for Player 1 such that the payoff is at least 1+γ 2 . By Von Neumann's Min-Max Theorem (cf. e.g. [41] ), we also have that there exists a mixed strategy of Player 1 such that for all pure strategies of Player 2 the expected payoff is larger than 1+γ 2 . In other words, this means that there exists a size s circuit sampler O such that for all measures M with µ(M) = 1 − ε and M(x) ∈ {0, 1} for all but one x,
We are now going to use the oracle O to obtain an oracle adversary A O breaking ε-security of the game G. First define δ and δ 1 such that for all x ∈ X ,
Note that in particular δ(x) = δ 1 (x) iff P (x) = 1, whereas δ(x) = −δ(x) otherwise. We also observe that δ 1 (x) = 2 · p G,O 1 (x) − 1, and the definition of O yields E We now are going to define one such measure: To this end we fix an ordering x 1 , x 2 , . . . of the elements of X such that δ(x 1 ) ≤ δ(x 2 ) ≤ · · · , and define M * : X → [0, 1] to be the unique measure with µ(M * ) = 1 − ε and such that there exists an i * with M * (x i ) = 1 for all i < i * , M * (x i * ) ∈ [0, 1], and M * (x i ) = 0 for all i > i * . We let δ * = δ(x i * ) and note that δ * > γ, as otherwise E
Recall now that E is the (s, s , q, γ(1−ε)/4, γ(1−ε)/4)-p 1 -estimator guaranteed to exist. We consider the following adversary A O :
We now consider the experiment where A O interacts with C(x) for x $ ← P X , and shows that it guesses P (x) with probability larger than 1+ε 2 . Define the event bad that estimate of z is more than γ(1 − ε)/4 off the actual value of p 1 (x). Recall that Pr [bad] ≤ γ(1 − ε)/4 by definition. First, note that for each input x ∈ X , the probability that A O guesses the right bit P (x) when interacting with C(x) is
where δ(x) = δ 1 if P (x) = 1, and δ(x) = −δ 1 if P (x) = 0. Then, note that conditioned on bad not occurring, we have δ(x) − δ(x) < γ(1 − ε)/2. Summarizing, the probability that A guesses P (x) satisfies
In particular, the probability is larger than 1+ε 2 by the fact that E
To conclude the proof, we observe that an adversary A, without access to O, guessing with probability also larger than 1+ε 2 can be obtained by non-deterministically fixing the choice of B 1 , . . . , B q to the optimal one.
C Proof of Proposition 3
Proof (of Proposition 3). As shown in [25] , it suffices to give a protocol for the distribution P XY Z where X = Y is a random bit, Z is such that it equals ⊥ with probability 1 − β, and X with probability β. Note that conditioned on Z = ⊥, X is uniform. Clearly, P XY Z ∈ D(1, β). Let now (X 1 , Y 1 , Z 1 ), . . . , (X n , Y n , Z n ) $ ← P XY Z . By the Chernoff Bound, the adversary sees Z i = ⊥ for at least (1 − β) · n/2 = + 2 log(1/ε) + O(1) components of (Z 1 , . . . , Z n ), except with probability e −(1−β)n/8 = O( √ ε · e − (κ)/4 ). The encryption KAEnc sets the ciphertext C to be the seed S of a two-universal family of hash functions with input length n(κ), and output length (κ), whereas the derived key is K = h S (X 1 , . . . , X n ). Naturally, KADec also outputs K = h S (Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) = K given S. Given any outcome of Z 1 , . . . , Z n , and conditioned on the even that at least a fraction (1−β)/2 of the coordinates has value ⊥, X 1 , . . . , X n has entropy (κ) + 2 log(1/ε (κ)) + O(1), and the resulting key K is ε -close to uniform by the Leftover-hash Lemma [20] , given C = S and Z 1 , . . . , Z n .
D Formal Proof of Lemma 2
Let us fix an arbitrary polynomial p, and let γ such that γ(κ) = 1/p(κ), and moreover, let A be a polynomial-size adversary. We are going to prove that for any such p and any such A, the advantage of A in breaking XCCA security of PKE in is at most n(κ) · γ(κ) + ε(κ). Since ε(κ) is negligible, n(κ) is polynomial, and p can be chosen to be arbitrarily large, it follows that PKE in is XCCA secure.
Let us consider the XCCA game with adversary A, denoted XCCA A (κ). First off, for ease of notation, we let r Gen (We are not going to specify the function s(κ) exactly, but it will clear that it can be defined more precisely depending on the construction of adversary A i in the proof of Claim 1 below, which will be equal to s (κ) = s (κ) + poly(κ).)
The proof proceeds by introducing two additional games, XCCA A 1 (κ) and XCCA A 2 (κ). We are going to prove that the probabilities of A winning XCCA A (κ) and XCCA A 1 (κ) are closely related by the hardcore lemma for CCA-security, whereas we are going to show that the probabilities are close for XCCA A 1 (κ) and XCCA A 2 (κ) because of the information-theoretic security of the underlying one-way key agreement protocol. Finally, it will be easy to see that no adversary can win in XCCA A 2 (κ). Concretely, we first modify the XCCA A (κ) game into game XCCA A 1 (κ) in that the process of sampling the challenge ciphertext c * is modified as follows: We also consider a final game XCCA A 2 (κ) where the key k is simply sampled randomly and independently of anything else.
The final statement follows by the straightforward combination of the following three claims, which are proved individually below.
Claim 1 For all adversaries A of size s , we have
Claim 2 For all adversaries A (possibly computationally unbounded), Proof (Of Claim 1). We define hybrid experiments XCCA A (i, κ) for i = 0, . . . , n which are defined as XCCA A 1 (κ), but with the exception that b [j] = b[j] holds for all j = 1, . . . , n − i, whereas b [j] is defined as in XCCA A 1 (κ) otherwise. In particular, by definition it is easy to see that XCCA A (0, κ) and XCCA A (n, κ) equal XCCA A (κ) and XCCA A 1 (κ), respectively. Therefore, with q i = Pr A wins in XCCA A (i, κ) , we clearly obtain
We are now going to upper bound with γ the difference q i −q i+1 for all i = 0, . . . , n−1, which concludes the proof. To this end, assume towards a contradiction that q i − q i+1 > γ. Then, we consider a variant of XCCA A (i + 1, κ) called XCCA A (−i, κ) where, whenever c[i] = 1, instead of setting b [i] to a random bit, we set b [i] = 1 − b[i], and let q −i be the corresponding success probability of A in XCCA A (−i, κ). Then, q i − q −i > 2γ, since q i+1 = 1 2 q i + 1 2 q −i . Using this, we are going to construct an adversary A i which contradicts the hardcore lemma. The adversary will need to know M in the following description, which may not be efficiently implementable. However, we note that we can de-randomize the A i , and in this case, it is easy to see computing M is not necessary any more by fixing the best randomness. Note that the complexity of A i is s (κ) as defined above, and we now analyze the success probability of A i in contradicting the hardcore lemma. Concretely, A i interacts with CCA(r Gen , r Enc , b) for (r Gen , r Enc , b) $ ← P M , and outputs a guess b . We are going to prove that b = b with probability larger than 1+γ 2 , contradicting the hardcore lemma. We first observe that the probability that A i guesses b is the sum of the probability that the simulated A guesses d given e = b and the probability that A is wrong in guessing d given e = 1 − b, i.e., it equals 
because of the fact that Proof (Of Claim 2). In games XCCA A 1 and XCCA A 2 , let us look at the distribution P XY Z where X = b [i], Z = Enc(pk[i], b[i]), and Y is arbitrary such that it equals X with probability 1+α 2 (for any i, as the distribution is independent of i). Then, it is easy to see that P XY Z ∈ D(α, β). Moreover, given samples Z 1 , . . . , Z n , as well as (K, C ) $ ← KAEnc(X 1 , . . . , X n ) and K $ ← {0, 1} in , we can simulate the challenge ciphertext distributions in XCCA A 1 and XCCA A 2 . It is therefore easy to verify that the statistical distance between the challenge ciphertexts in XCCA A 1 and XCCA A 2 is at most ε(κ), and so the difference in the probability of adversary outputting one in both games. Claim 3) . This is obvious by the fact that the key k being independent of anything else ensures that the encryptions of m 0 and m 1 are perfectly indistinguishable.
Proof (Of
E Formal Proof of Lemma 3
Assume, towards a contradiction, that PKE is not CCA secure: There is a polynomial-sized adversary A and a polynomial p, such that, for infinitely many κ ∈ N, A achieves advantage 1/p(κ) in the CCA game with security parameter κ, denoted as CCA2 A PKE (κ). Then, we construct another polynomial-sized adversary B that violates the XCCA security of the inner encryption scheme PKE in ; in particular, B achieves advantage 1/2p(κ) in the game XCCA B PKE in (κ) for infinitely many κ's. Fix one κ ∈ N. Let τ (κ) be an upper bound on the the size of A. On a high level, the machine B on input 1 κ participates externally in the XCCA B PKE in (κ) game, and internally tries to emulate an execution of CCA2 A PKE (κ); in particular, B has access to all the component decryption oracles {Dec(sk[i], ·)} i∈[n] externally, and needs to emulate the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) for the adversary A internally. More precisely, B proceeds in the following five stages:
Stage 1-Heavy Ciphertext Pre-sampling: Set Γ = Γ (κ) = ω(log(κ)) · 4p(κ) · τ (κ) · n .
After receiving externally a public key pk, for each component key pk[i], B internally samples Γ random component ciphertexts, that is, for each j ∈ [Γ ], B sets e ij $ ← Enc(pk[i], r ij ) for a fresh randomly sampled bit r ij . Furthermore, B obtains the decrypted bit b ij of e ij , by querying the external decryption oracle Dec(sk[i], ·) on e ij . 5 Then it records (e ij , b ij ). As we will see shortly in Stage 5, the pre-sampled ciphertexts and decrypted bits {(e ij , b ij )} i∈[n],j∈[Γ ] are very instrumental for emulating answers to after-the-fact queries from A. Stage 2-Answering Before-the-Fact Queries: B internally generates the public-and secret-key pairs of the two outer schemes, (pk out,i , sk out,i ) $ ← Gen out,i for i = 1, 2. After sending the adversary A the public key pk = (pk in , pk out,1 , pk out,2 ), it emulates the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) for A as follows: Given a query c = (c out,1 , c out,2 ) from A, B first decrypts c out,1 using the secret key sk out,1 to obtain the inner ciphertext c in = (c 1 , · · · , c n , , γ , η ). B does not know the secret key sk for decrypting the inner ciphertext; instead, it uses the external decryption oracles Dec(sk[i], ·) to decrypt each of the component ciphertexts c 1 , · · · , c n to obtain the encrypted bits b 1 , · · · , b n ; it then recovers the encrypted message (m , r out,1 , r out,2 ) from γ and η as algorithm Dec in does. Finally, it checks consistency of the ciphertext, that is, whether c out,i = Enc out,i (pk out,i , c in ; r out,i ) for i = 1, 2, and returns m if the ciphertext is consistent and ⊥ otherwise. Stage 3-Generating Challenge Messages: After receiving the two challenge messages m * 0 , m * 1 from A, B samples random strings r * out,1 , r * out,2 , and sends externally two challenge messages m * 0 r * out,1 r * out,2 and m * 1 r * out,1 r * out,2 .
Stage 4-Emulating Challenge Ciphertext: Upon receiving the challenge ciphertext c * in = Enc in (pk, m * b r * out,1 r * out,2 ) for some random bit b, B generates the challenge ciphertext of PKE for A by encrypting c * in using public keys of the two outer schemes and randomness r * out,1 and r * out,2 , that is, c * out,i = Enc out,i (pk out,i , c * in ; r * out,i ) for i = 1, 2. It then sends (c * out,1 , c * out,2 ) to A. Stage 5-Answering After-the-Fact Queries: B emulates answers to A's after-the-fact decryption queries (c out,1 , c out,2 ) almost the same as it did with before-the-fact queries in Stage 2, except that, after obtaining the inner ciphertext c in = (c 1 , · · · , c n , γ , η ), if one of the component ciphertext c i coincides with the corresponding component in the challenge ciphertext c * i , B cannot query the external decryption oracle Dec(sk[i], ·) (after-the-fact) to obtain the decrypted bit b i . When this happens for some component, B simply checks whether c i is one of the pre-sampled component ciphertext e ij , if so it also obtains the decrypted bit b i = b ij ; otherwise, it outputs fail. Output: Finally, B outputs the bit b returned by A.
We show that except with probability 1/2p(κ), B in game XCCA B PKE in (κ) emulates the view of A in CCA2 A PKE (κ) perfectly; then if A has advantage 1/p(κ) in the CCA game, B achieves 1/2p(κ) advantage in the XCCA game. Note that B emulates the public key and challenge ciphertext of PKE for A perfectly; furthermore, it emulates the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) for A perfectly in Stage 2 by decrypting before-the-fact queries as the algorithm Dec does using the secret key sk out,1 and the external component decryption oracles Dec(sk[i], ·). For the same reason, B also emulates the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) perfectly in Stage 5, provided that it can decrypt all the component ciphertexts using either the external decryption oracles or the set of pre-sampled component ciphertexts and decrypted bits. Therefore, conditioned on that B does not output fail, it emulates the view of A perfectly. As we show below in Claim 4, the probability that B outputs fail is bounded by 1/2p(κ); then, except with probability 1/2p(κ), B emulates the view of A perfectly, and thus has advantage 1/2p(κ) in the XCCA game. This contradicts with the XCCA security of PKE in and concludes the lemma.
Claim 4 For all sufficiently large κ ∈ N, the probability that B outputs fail in an execution of XCCA B PKE in (κ) is smaller than 1/2p(κ).
Proof. Recall that the outer encryption scheme PKE out,i , i = 1, 2, has almost perfect correctness, that is, with overwhelming probability, a randomly generated key pair (pk out,i , sk out,i ) has perfect correctness. It is easy to see that it suffices to show that conditioned on that the two outer encryption key pairs (pk out,1 , sk out,1 ) and (pk out,2 , sk out,2 ) sampled by B have perfect correctness, the probability that B outputs fail is smaller than 1/3p(κ). Therefore, below we bound the probability that B outputs fail, assuming implicitly that the outer encryption keys have perfect correctness; when referring to the value encrypted in the an outer ciphertext, we mean the unique value decrypted from that ciphertext. Recall that B outputs fail when A (in emulation by B) makes an after-the-fact decryption query (c out,1 , c out,2 ) that has the inner ciphertext c in = (c 1 , · · · , c n , γ , η ) decrypted from c out,1 "quote" the inner ciphertext c * in = (c * 1 , · · · , c * n , γ * , η * ) of the challenge ciphertext (i.e., ∃i ∈ [n] such that c i = c * i ), yet the quoted component ciphertext c * i is not one of the pre-sampled component ciphertexts (i.e., c * i = e ij for all j ∈ [Γ ]); we denote this event as quote. Thus, it is equivalent to bound the probability that event quote occurs in an execution with A as emulated by B. Towards this, we introduce a sequence of hybrids H 0 to H 5 , where H 0 emulates the view of A identically as B does. We show that in every two subsequent hybrids, the probabilities that event quote occurs differ by at most a negligible amount and the probability that event quote occurs in H 5 is bounded by 1/4p(κ). Therefore, we derive that the probability that quote occurs in H 0 is at most 1/3p(κ), and so is the probability that quote occurs in an execution of B.
Hybrid H 0 internally runs A and emulates its view identically as B does, by acting as B and entities in the game XCCA B PKE in (κ) (including the external challenger and the decryption oracles Dec(sk[i], ·)).
By construction, we have that:
Pr[quote occurs in execution of B] = Pr[quote occurs in H 0 ] .
Hybrid H 1 proceeds identically to H 0 , except that the inner-ciphertext c * in of the challenge ciphertext encrypts an all-zero string, instead of (m * b , r * out,1 , r * out,2 ) (for some random bit b). We claim that the probability that quote occurs in H 1 is negligibly close to that in H 0 . First note that in both H 0 and H 1 , whether the event quote occurs can be efficiently decided using the secret key sk out,1 of the first outer encryption scheme. Furthermore, since in the two hybrids the secret key sk of the inner encryption scheme is only used for emulating the component decryption oracles Dec(sk[i], ·), if the probabilities that quote occurs differ by a non-negligible amount, we can use A to construct a machine to violate the XCCA security of the inner encryption scheme. This summarized by the following subclaim. Hybrid H 2 proceeds identically to H 1 , except that the second outer-ciphertext c * out,2 of the challenge ciphertext encrypts an all-zero string, instead of the inner-ciphertext c * in . Note that the secret key sk out,2 of the second outer encryption scheme is never used in the execution of H 1 and H 2 , and the random string r out,2 used to generate c out,2 is uniformly randomly sampled and independent of all other messages. (Furthermore, as discussed above, whether quote occurs or not can be efficiently decided using the first outer secret key sk out,1 .) Therefore, it follows from the semantic security of the second outer encryption scheme PKE out,2 that the probabilities that quote occurs in H 1 and H 2 differ by at most a negligible amount.
SubClaim 2 There is a negligible function µ 2 , such that, for all κ ∈ N, |Pr[quote occurs in H 1 ] − Pr[quote occurs in H 2 ]| ≤ µ 2 (κ) .
Hybrid H 3 proceeds identically to H 2 , except that H 3 emulates the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) for A using the secret key sk out,2 of the second outer encryption scheme (as opposed to sk out,1 of the first outer encryption scheme), and the secret key sk of the inner ciphertext (instead of the external decryption oracles Dec(sk[i], ·) together with the pre-sampled component ciphertexts and decrypted bits {e ij , b ij } i∈[n],j∈[Γ ] ). More precisely, H 3 emulates Dec(sk, ·) as follows: Upon receiving a decryption query (c out,1 , c out,2 ) from A, H 3 decrypts the second outer ciphertext c out,2 using sk out,2 to obtain an inner ciphertext c in = (c 1 , · · · , c n , γ , η ); it then decrypts each of c i using sk[i] to obtain the decrypted bit b i , and recovers the message (m , r out,1 , r out,2 ) as algorithm Dec in does; finally it check consistency of the ciphertext by checking whether c out,i = Enc out,i (pk out,1 , c in ; r out,i ) for i = 1, 2. Note that this way of emulating the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) uses only sk out,2 and sk, but not sk out,1 and {e ij , b ij } i∈[n],j∈[Γ ] ; therefore H 3 never outputs fail. However, the event quote (defined w.r.t. the unique inner-ciphertexts encrypted in the first outer ciphertexts of the decryption queries from A) is still well defined. We claim that the probability that quote occurs in H 2 and H 3 are identical. This is because the only difference between the two hybrids lies in how the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) is emulated. In H 2 , before event quote occurs, the decryption oracle Dec(sk, ·) are emulated perfectly. In H 3 , given that the key pairs of the two outer encryption schemes have perfect correctness, the plaintext computed using sk out,2 and sk is always the same as that returned by the real decryption oracle using sk out,1 and sk. Thus before quote occurs, the views of A are identical in the two hybrids and so are the probabilities that event quote occurs.
Pr[quote occurs in H 2 ] = Pr[quote occurs in H 3 ] .
Hybrid H 4 proceeds identically to H 3 , except that the first outer-ciphertext c * out,1 of the challenge ciphertext encrypts an all-zero string, instead of the inner-ciphertext c * in . Note that in both H 3 and H 4 the secret key sk out,1 of the first outer encryption scheme is never used. It seems that, as in Assume for contradiction that there is a fixed execution with A deciding c q i , for which the above inequality does not hold. Then it implies that:
Pr rc [c q i = c * i ] > 1 4p(κ)τ (κ)n .
Since each e ij is generated identically as the i'th component ciphertext c * i of the challenge ciphertext is generated, we have that for all j ∈ [Γ ].
Pr re [c q i = e ij ] > 1 4p(κ)τ (κ)n Furthermore, since all e ij 's are generated randomly and independently, we have that,
The last inequality holds since Γ = ω(log(κ))4p(κ)τ (κ)n. This gives a contradiction, and concludes the proof of this subclaim.
